

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 213104

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: EG, IS, PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 633 - AUGUST 22, 1978

LONDON FOR GLASPIE  
PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY  
OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED NOT  
RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

1. ISRAEL. A RECENT POLL INDICATES THAT A SIGNIFICANT MAJORITY OF ISRAELIS ARE SATISFIED WITH THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TOWARD PEACE. THE POLL, PUBLISHED SUNDAY BY A MAJOR ISRAELI NEWSPAPER, SHOWED THAT 54 PERCENT OF THOSE QUESTIONED BELIEVE THE GOVERNMENT IS DOING ALL IT CAN TO ACHIEVE PEACE, WHILE ANOTHER 15 PERCENT FEEL THE GOVERNMENT IS DOING "MORE OR LESS" EVERYTHING NECESSARY. THE POLL ALSO DISCLOSED THAT 63 PERCENT OF THOSE SURVEYED BELIEVE THE CHANCES OF PEACE ARE BETTER UNDER PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S ADMINISTRATION THAN UNDER THE PREVIOUS LABOR GOVERNMENT; ONLY 7 PERCENT FEEL CHANCES FOR PEACE ARE WORSE NOW. ALTHOUGH THE QUESTIONS IN THIS POLL DIFFER FROM THOSE IN ONE TAKEN ON JULY 26, ONE WEEK AFTER THE

TALKS AT LEEDS, ENGLAND, BOTH INDICATE SOLID MAJORITIES  
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SUPPORTING BEGIN'S CONDUCT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YADIN, MEANWHILE, SUFFERED A DEFEAT ON AUGUST 17 AT A DMC COUNCIL MEETING WHEN HIS PROPOSAL TO HOLD INTERNAL ELECTIONS NOW AND DEFER A DEBATE ON PARTY POLICY UNTIL AFTER THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT WAS REJECTED. YADIN APPARENTLY MISCALCULATED THE BALANCE OF FORCES AT THE MEETING AND SOUGHT TO MAKE THE VOTE A PERSONAL TEST OF STRENGTH. THIS LATEST SETBACK IS SYMPTOMATIC OF YADIN'S FAILINGS. A NOTED GENERAL AND ARCHAEOLOGIST, YADIN'S POLITICAL INCOMPETENCY HAS MADE HIM SOMETHING OF A LAUGHINGSTOCK IN ISRAELI POLITICS.

3. ADOPTION OF THE DEBATE-BEFORE-ELECTION MOTION WAS A BOOST FOR THE DOVISH SHINUI FACTION. IN FACT, SHINUI SEIZED ON THE PROPOSAL, INTRODUCED BY THE MEIR AMIT FACTION, TO PUT YADIN ON NOTICE THAT A SHINUI-AMIT COALITION HAD THE VOTES TO DEFEAT HIM. THE CLOSENESS OF THE VOTE REFLECTS A PARTY NOW ALMOST EVELY DIVIDED ON YADIN'S LEADERSHIP AND PERHAPS ON THE QUESTION OF STAYING IN THE COALITION.

4. THE CONTINUING EROSION OF HIS POLITICAL BASE HAS REDUCED MUCH OF THE POLITICAL LEVERAGE YADIN HAD ENJOYED IN THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT. BEGIN CAN FEEL SECURE IN THE BELIEF THAT WHATEVER HAPPENS IN THE DMC, A NUMBER OF OPPORTUNISTIC DMC KNESSET MEMBERS WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT

THE COALITION. A PARTY SPLIT WOULD ENGENDER GREAT BITTERNESS; THOSE WHO STAY WITH THE COALITION WILL LOSE ANY ALTERNATIVE TO REMAINING WITHIN IT. BEGIN WILL CONSEQUENTLY BE ABLE TO REDUCE THE ALREADY SMALL PRICE HE MUST PAY FOR THIS SUPPORT.

5. THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT YADIN'S PRINCIPAL SUPPORTER, SHMUEL TAMIR, WILL ACTUALLY REJOIN THE LIKUD. AN OPPORTUNIST PAR EXCELLENCE, TAMIR IS ALSO A CONSUMMATE CONFIDENTIAL

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POLITICAL SURVIVOR. TAMIR USED THE DMC TO SECURE FOR HIMSELF A POSITION IN THE CABINET. HE NOW APPRECIATES THAT HE HAS GOTTEN ALL THE MILEAGE HE CAN OUT OF YADIN AND WILL NOW HAVE RECOURSE TO WHATEVER MANEUVERS SEEM MOST USEFUL.

6. TAMIR WILL WANT TO ASSURE A PLACE FOR HIMSELF AND HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATE AKIVA NOF IN THE NEXT KNESSET. HIS OPTIONS SEEM LIMITED TO RECONSTITUTING THE FREE CENTER PARTY OR REJOINING THE LIKUD. WHILE A LONG HISTORY OF PERSONAL ANTAGONISM BETWEEN BEGIN AND TAMIR WOULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES IN THE LATTER COURSE, NEITHER MAN WOULD REFUSE TO CONSUMMATE A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE. IN ANY EVENT, TAMIR WILL NOT BE CONSTRAINED BY ANY FEELING OF LOYALTY TO, OR DEPENDENCE UPON, YADIN.

7. YADIN IS CONSEQUENTLY REDUCED IN STATUS AND HIS FUTURE PROSPECTS ARE BLEAK. HE HAS LITTLE REAL SUPPORT. POLLS HAVE FOR MONTHS SHOWN THE DMC BEING OBLITERATED AT THE NEXT ELECTION. YADIN LACKS CHARISMA, A POLITICAL MACHINE, OR AN INDEPENDENT STATUS AMONG THE ISRAELI ELECTORATE. UNLIKE DAYAN, YADIN SEEMS TO LACK ANY UNUSUAL ABILITIES WHICH RENDER HIS RETENTION IN AN IMPORTANT POSITION IMPERATIVE. YADIN SEEMS CONDEMNED TO BEAR A HIGH-SOUNDING POST WITH LITTLE REAL INFLUENCE, AND THEN FADE FROM THE PICTURE. FOR THESE REASONS, HE IS LIKELY TO PLAY AN INSIGNIFICANT ROLE IN ISRAELI PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMP DAVID TALKS. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. JORDAN. KING HUSSEIN WELCOMES THE CAMP DAVID TALKS, BUT HE IS NOT SANGUINE THAT THEY WILL LEAD TO ANY BREAKTHROUGHS. HE HAS LONG BEEN CONVINCED THAT HE MUST KEEP HIS DISTANCE FROM SADAT'S PEACE INITIATIVES AND IS UNLIKELY CONFIDENTIAL

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TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO JOIN THE TALKS. THE BELIEF IS TAKING HOLD IN AMMAN THAT JORDAN'S EFFORT TO STEER A COURSE BETWEEN SADAT AND HIS ARAB OPPONENTS CANNOT BE MAINTAINED MUCH LONGER, BUT THE KING DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ANY NEW

STRATEGIES IN MIND.

9. HUSSEIN SEES LACK OF MOVEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS AS POSING A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE MODERATE ARAB REGIMES. HE BELIEVES A CONTINUED STALEMATE WILL DISCREDIT SADAT AND POSSIBLY LEAD TO THE EGYPTIAN LEADER'S OVERTHROW, AN EVENT THAT WOULD PLACE SEVERE PRESSURE ON THE MODERATE GOVERNMENTS. HUSSEIN SHOWS LITTLE INCLINATION, HOWEVER, TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS ALONG BY OFFERING TO MEDIATE ON THE WEST BANK AND PALESTINIAN ISSUES THAT ARE THE STUMBLING BLOCKS.

10. THE KING IS AWARE THAT THE RISKS OF JOINING IN SADAT'S INITIATIVE ARE AS SUBSTANTIAL AS THOSE POSED BY THE CONTINUING STALEMATE. SYRIAN DISAPPROVAL, UNEASE AMONG HIS EAST BANK CONSTITUENCY, AND INCREASED TENSION WITH THE PALESTINIANS ARE ONLY A FEW OF THE PROBLEMS SUCH A MOVE COULD CAUSE. HUSSEIN, MOREOVER, REMAINS DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS

OF SADAT'S INTENTIONS; HE FEARS THAT THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT REALLY WANTS JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION IN TALKS WITH ISRAEL ONLY AS A COVER FOR ARRANGING A DEAL WITH ISRAEL ON THE SINAI.

11. HUSSEIN'S SUSPICIONS ARE FUELED BY SADAT'S RELUCTANCE TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. SADAT DOES NOT DO SO BECAUSE HE VIEWS HUSSEIN AS A WEAK AND INDECISIVE RULER AND A MINOR PLAYER IN MIDDLE EAST POLITICS. MOREOVER, SADAT APPARENTLY BELIEVES HUSSEIN CAN BE PRESSURED INTO JOINING THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE CRUCIAL MOMENT. SADAT KNOWS JORDAN'S PARTICIPATION WILL BECOME CRITICAL WHEN WEST BANK AND PALESTINIAN ISSUES MUST BE NEGOTIATED IN DETAIL WITH ISRAEL BECAUSE HE HAS NO MANDATE FOR SUCH CONFIDENTIAL

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TALKS. IF AT CAMP DAVID THE ISRAELIS ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, SADAT WILL EXPECT THE US AND SAUDI ARABIA TO ASSIST HIM IN BRINGING HUSSEIN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

12. OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS, HUSSEIN HAS TRIED TO AVOID THE RISKS BY PROMOTING A VARIETY OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES. HE HAS ATTEMPTED TO ENLIST SAUDI SUPPORT FOR A RECONCILIATION EFFORT, PUSHED FOR AN ARAB SUMMIT, AND TRIED HIS HAND AT PERSONAL DIPLOMACY, ALL IN AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE A UNIFIED ARAB POSITION THAT WOULD KEEP THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS MOVING.

13. HUSSEIN NOW APPEARS FRUSTRATED AND BEREFT OF NEW IDEAS. HE CONTINUES TO CALL FOR THE US TO PRESS ISRAEL TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS BUT SEES LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THIS WILL HAPPEN SOON. SOME JORDANIAN NEWSPAPERS AND A HANDFUL OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE SUGGESTED

THAT THE SADAT INITIATIVE COULD SOMEHOW BE COMBINED WITH A RECONVENED GENEVA CONFERENCE THAT WOULD ALLOW SADAT TO END DIRECT TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS WITHOUT ADMITTING FAILURE.

14. THIS IDEA, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO HAVE AROUSED ONLY LIMITED INTEREST. OFFICIAL JORDANIAN REACTION TO THE TALKS SCHEDULED NEXT MONTH BETWEEN SADAT AND BEGIN HAS BEEN FAVORABLE. THE JORDANIAN PRESS, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN GENERALLY CRITICAL OF THE TALKS, SEEING THEM AS LITTLE MORE THAN A LAST-DITCH US EFFORT TO SALVAGE SADAT'S PEACE INITIATIVES.

15. THE KING INSISTS THAT NEGOTIATIONS -- WHATEVER THE VENUE -- MUST BE PRECEDED BY ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON TWO CONFIDENTIAL

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POINTS: WITHDRAWAL TO THE JUNE 1967 BORDERS "WITH MUTUAL, MINOR MODIFICATIONS," AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT COULD PROBABLY BE MET BY AN ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 -- WHICH HUSSEIN REGARDS AS A "DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES" SUFFICIENT FOR THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS. HUSSEIN PROBABLY REQUIRES AN EXPLICIT ISRAELI DECLARATION ON SELF-DETERMINATION.

16. HUSSEIN'S INSISTENCE ON SUCH A DECLARATION IS IN PART A MATTER OF SELF-INTEREST -- HE HAS TO BE IN LINE WITH OTHER ARAB STATES ON THIS ISSUE -- BUT IT IS ALSO DESIGNED TO MEET AS MANY PALESTINIAN DEMANDS AS POSSIBLE TO AVOID ANY RESIDUE OR IRREDENTISM.

17. THE JORDANIANS INTERPRET SELF-DETERMINATION TO MEAN A PLEBISCITE, PROBABLY COMING AT THE END OF A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD DURING WHICH THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WOULD BE ADMINISTERED BY SOME SORT OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY. IN THE PLEBISCITE, THE PALESTINIANS WOULD VOTE ON A SERIES OF OPTIONS REGARDING THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE AREA.

18. ROYAL COURT CHIEF SHARAF, AN INFLUENTIAL ADVISER TO THE KING, HAS CALLED FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL PALESTINIANS -- NOT JUST WEST BANKERS AND GAZANS -- IN SUCH A PLEBISCITE, BUT HUSSEIN HAS BEEN NONCOMMITTAL AND WOULD PROBABLY PREFER TO SEE THE VOTE RESTRICTED TO CURRENT RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP.

19. A KEY JORDANIAN ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE CHOICES IN A PLEBISCITE WOULD NOT INCLUDE AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE, WHICH HUSSEIN BELIEVES WOULD EVENTUALLY THREATEN HIS REGIME. HUSSEIN HOPES THAT BIG-POWER PRESSURE, COUPLED WITH ISRAELI DEMANDS, WILL RESTRICT CHOICES AND THAT THE MOST ATTRACTIVE WILL BE SOME SORT OF A PALESTIN-

IAN FEDERATION WITH JORDAN.  
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20. JORDAN IS NOT TRYING TO UNDERCUT THE PALESTINIANS IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, HUSSEIN MAINTAINS, AND IS COMMITTED TO HAVING "REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN ARAB PEOPLE" INVOLVED. THE CONTINUED USE OF SUCH LANGUAGE, DELIBERATELY OMITTING ANY REFERENCE TO THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, POINTS TO JORDAN'S PREFERENCE FOR NON-PLO PALESTINIANS AS MEMBERS OF THE NEGOTIATING TEAM.

21. PROVIDED THAT ISRAEL AGREES TO WITHDRAW IN ADVANCE, JORDAN IS WILLING TO ACCEPT AN EXTENDED TRANSITIONAL PERIOD -- PREFERABLY UNDER UN AUSPICES -- ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA. HUSSEIN DOES NOT WANT THE JORDANIAN ARMY INVOLVED IN A PEACEKEEPING ROLE ON THE WEST BANK DURING THIS PERIOD AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN PLACE. HUSSEIN MAINTAINS THAT ISREAL WOULD HAVE TO DISMANTLE ITS SETTLEMENTS DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD, ALTHOUGH HE IS WILLING TO PERMIT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR ISRAELIS ON THE WEST BANK DURING AND AFTER THE TRANSITION.

22. JORDAN HAS LONG BEEN WILLING TO MEET ISRAELI DEMANDS FOR NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS AS PART OF A FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT, AND AMMAN WOULD HAVE LITTLE DIFFICULTY LIVING WITH ISRAELI DEMANDS ON THIS SUBJECT. JORDAN IS FAR LESS FLEXIBLE ON THE DIFFICULT ISSUE OF EAST JERUSALEM. HUSSEIN INSISTS THAT ISRAEL RETURN EAST JERUSALEM TO ARAB SOVEREIGNTY AND ALSO GIVE BACK ALL LAND THAT IT HAS INCORPORATED INTO JERUSALEM'S MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES SINCE THE ISRAELIS OCCUPIED THE CITY IN 1967.

23. HUSSEIN HAS OBVIOUSLY GIVEN A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT  
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TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND THE OUTLINES OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT. IN MAKING FINAL DECISION, HOWEVER, HE WILL HAVE TO SUBORDINATE HIS PERSONAL PREFERENCES TO THE DESIRES OF JORDAN'S NEIGHBORS -- CHIEFLY SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA. (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN) CHRISTOPHER

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